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VOLUME 62 2017 NUMBER 3
Third Circuit Review
MILITIAS, MUSKETS, AND MACHINE GUNS? THE THIRD CIRCUIT
FURTHERS INAPPLICABILITY OF SECOND AMENDMENT
PROTECTION TO MACHINE GUN POSSESSION
IN UNITED STATES v. ONE PALMETTO
STATE ARMORY
PETER J. ADONIZIO, JR.*
“[W]e repeat today that the Second Amendment does not protect the
possession of machine guns.  They are not in common use
for lawful purposes.”1
I. BOOT CAMP: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S
TREATMENT OF MACHINE GUNS
The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States be-
stows upon Americans the right to “bear arms.”2  The purpose and extent
of this right has been extensively debated in courts of law since roughly a
century after the amendment’s inception.3  Much of the dispute over the
* J.D. Candidate, 2018, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.B.A., 2013, Temple University.  I would like to thank my family and friends for
their endless support and encouragement, especially my parents, P.J. and Alicia
Adonizio, my brother Joseph P. Adonizio, and Maria LoBrutto.  I would also like to
thank the editors of the VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW for their feedback and input in
writing this Casebrief.
1. See United States v. One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d 136, 142 (3d Cir.
2016) (reiterating Third Circuit and Supreme Court precedent that machine gun
possession is not protected by Second Amendment).
2. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.”).
3. See, e.g., Michael P. O’Shea, The Right to Defensive Arms After District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 349, 350–51 (2009) (listing possible purposes
of Second Amendment such as deterring government tyrants, protecting against
foreign invasion or internal disorder, promoting military readiness, hunting,
shooting sports, and self-defense against criminal violence); see Caetano v. Massa-
chusetts, 136 S. Ct. 1027, 1032–33 (2016) (asserting that Second Amendment pro-
tects possession of bearable arms not in existence at time of enactment);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (holding that Fourteenth
(483)
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Second Amendment has focused on whether the right to bear arms ap-
plies individually, to citizens in everyday life, or collectively and only in the
militia context.4  The Supreme Court settled this question in District of Co-
lumbia v. Heller5 when it held that the right to bear arms is bestowed upon
all citizens individually, rather than collectively to militias.6
In Heller, however, the Supreme Court also acknowledged that Sec-
ond Amendment rights are not unlimited and can be restricted by some
state and federal statutes.7  One such statute is the Gun Control Act of
1968, as amended in 1986, which makes it “unlawful for any person to
transfer or possess a machinegun.”8  The combination of Heller and the
Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates Second Amendment rights against
state governments); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 594 (2008) (con-
cluding that Second Amendment gives individuals right to bear arms for tradition-
ally lawful purposes other than militia service); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S.
174, 178 (1939) (declaring purpose of Second Amendment was to allow Congress
to “call forth” militias and holding that Second Amendment must be interpreted
in light of that purpose); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 585–86 (1886) (recogniz-
ing individual right to bear arms while upholding state law prohibiting privately
formed military organizations); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556
(1875) (asserting that Second Amendment only limits powers of federal govern-
ment, not states).
4. See Kyle Hatt, Gun-Shy Originalism: The Second Amendment’s Original Purpose in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 505, 505 (2011) (declaring
that Supreme Court had now “settled the long-debated question of whether the
Second Amendment applies outside the context of state-organized military institu-
tions”). Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 594 (asserting that right to bear arms is an
individual right unrelated to militia service), and Presser, 116 U.S. at 265 (declaring
that states cannot prohibit individuals from bearing arms), with Miller, 307 U.S. at
178 (determining that Second Amendment right was meant to ensure continua-
tion and effectiveness of militias).
5. 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
6. See id. at 594 (holding that individual right to bear arms is protected by
Second Amendment).
7. See id. at 595 (“Of course the [Second Amendment] right was not unlim-
ited, just as the First Amendment’s right of free speech was not.” (citing United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008))).  The Supreme Court acknowledged tradi-
tional limitations of the Second Amendment, such as prohibitions of firearm pos-
session “by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.” See id. at 626–27
(describing accepted limitations of Second Amendment firearm possession).
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2012) (“(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it
shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun.  (2) This
subsection does not apply with respect to— (A) a transfer to or by, or possession by
or under the authority of, the United States or any department or agency thereof
or a State, or a department, agency, or political subdivision thereof; or (B) any
lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machinegun that was lawfully possessed
before the date this subsection takes effect.”).  The Gun Control Act of 1968 did
not independently define “machine gun,” but cites and uses the IRS definition in
its National Firearms Act. See id.; see also I.R.C. § 5845(b) (2012) (“The term
‘machinegun’ means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be
readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual re-
loading, by a single function of the trigger.  The term shall also include the frame
or receiver of any such weapon, any part designed and intended solely and exclu-
2
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Gun Control Act creates an issue of whether a citizen’s Second Amend-
ment right to bear arms preempts the Act’s federal ban on machine gun
possession.9
The Supreme Court alluded to this issue in Heller by reaffirming “the
historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous and unusual
weapons.’”10  In 2010, the Third Circuit heard a closely related issue in
United States v. Marzzarella11 and held that “weapons not typically possessed
by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes” are not protected by an indi-
sively, or combination of parts designed and intended, for use in converting a
weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a
machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the
control of a person.”).  In 1986, the Gun Control Act was amended by the Firearm
Owners Protection Act of 1986. See National Firearms Act, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL,
TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, https://www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/na-
tional-firearms-act [https://perma.cc/D8QM-VUWS] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017).
The 1986 amendment contains the specific machine gun prohibition at issue in
the cases in this Casebrief. See id. (explaining provisions of Firearm Owners Pro-
tection Act of 1986).  The amendment bans all machine guns except those pos-
sessed by government agencies, or those legally possessed by individuals prior to
May 19, 1986. See id.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Fincher, 538 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (consid-
ering whether machine gun prohibition under Gun Control Act violated Second
Amendment), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1174 (2009); see Hollis v. Lynch, 827 F.3d 436,
439 (5th Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d
136, 138 (3d Cir. 2016) (same); United States v. Henry, 688 F.3d 637, 638 (9th Cir.
2012) (same); Hamblen v. United States, 591 F.3d 471, 472 (6th Cir. 2009) (same);
see also Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 784 F.3d 406, 407–08 (7th Cir. 2015)
(considering Second Amendment challenge to local machine gun ban), cert. denied
136 S. Ct. 447 (2015); Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244, 1247–48 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (considering Second Amendment challenge to local hand gun ban).
This Casebrief adopts the Third Circuit’s spelling of “machine gun” as two words,
except where “machinegun” is used in a quotation. See One Palmetto State Armory,
822 F.3d at 138 n.1 (explaining that “[f]ederal statutes and caselaw alternate be-
tween the spellings ‘machinegun’ and ‘machine gun’ [so] [w]e will use ‘machine
gun’ except when quoting materials that spell the term otherwise”).
10. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (citations omitted) (acknowledging tradi-
tional and historical limitations on Second Amendment).  The Supreme Court ex-
pressly recognized an important limitation on the Second Amendment, claiming
“that the sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common use at the time.’” See
id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).  The Court based
this limitation on “the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of ‘dangerous
and unusual weapons.’” See id. (first citing 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE
LAW OF ENGLAND 148–149 (1769); 3 B. WILSON, WORKS OF THE HONOURABLE JAMES
WILSON 79 (1804); J. DUNLAP, THE NEW-YORK JUSTICE 8 (1815); C. HUMPHREYS, A
COMPENDIUM OF THE COMMON LAW IN FORCE IN KENTUCKY 482 (1822); 1 W. RUS-
SELL, A TREATISE ON CRIMES AND INDICTABLE MISDEMEANORS 271–72 (1831); H. STE-
PHEN, SUMMARY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 48 (1840); E. LEWIS, AN ABRIDGMENT OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 64 (1847); F. WHARTON, A TREATISE ON THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 726 (1852), and then citing State v. Lang-
ford, 10 N.C. 381, 383–84 (1824); O’Neill v. State, 16 Ala. 65, 67 (1849); English v.
State, 35 Tex. 473, 476 (1871); State v. Lanier, 71 N.C. 288, 289 (1874)).
11. 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that Gun Control Act’s ban on fire-
arms with altered or destroyed serial numbers does not violate Second Amend-
ment), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1158 (2011).
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vidual’s constitutional right to bear arms.12  Then, in 2016, the Third Cir-
cuit directly considered whether the right to bear arms includes machine
guns in United States v. One Palmetto State Armory.13  The court held that the
Second Amendment does not protect possession of machine guns because
they are not commonly used for lawful purposes.14
The Third Circuit’s decision in One Palmetto State Armory followed Su-
preme Court jurisprudence and agreed with other circuits by concluding
that the Second Amendment does not protect a right to possess a machine
gun.15  Part II of this Casebrief outlines the background of Second
Amendment jurisprudence and federal gun control laws, along with other
circuit court decisions on this issue.16  Part III explains and analyzes the
facts, procedural history, and holding of One Palmetto State Armory.17  Fi-
nally, Part IV concludes with a critical analysis of One Palmetto State Armory
and its impact for practitioners in the Third Circuit, including possible
arguments to defend or argue against the decision and the machine gun
ban.18
II. BASIC TRAINING: A BACKGROUND OF SECOND AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE, FEDERAL GUN CONTROL LAWS,
AND OTHER CIRCUIT DECISIONS
The judicial debate over the Second Amendment’s purpose and
reach was confined to few major Supreme Court cases prior to the
1970s.19  After Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 1968, Americans
on both sides of the gun control debate became more intrigued with gun
control policy.20  Most recently, the Supreme Court added to the ongoing
12. See id. at 90–91 (“Accordingly, the right to bear arms, as codified in the
Second Amendment, affords no protection to ‘weapons not typically possessed by
law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 624-25)).
13. 822 F.3d 136, 138 (3d Cir. 2016).
14. See id. at 142 (“[W]e repeat today that the Second Amendment does not
protect the possession of machine guns.  They are not in common use for lawful
purposes.” (citations omitted)).
15. For a further discussion of the facts, procedure, and narrative analysis of
One Palmetto State Armory, see infra notes 65–123 and accompanying text.
16. For a further discussion of the background of the machine gun ban and
constitutional right to bear arms, see infra notes 19–64 and accompanying text.
17. For a further discussion of the facts, procedure, and narrative analysis of
One Palmetto State Armory, see infra notes 65–123 and accompanying text.
18. For a further discussion of a critical analysis and future impact of One
Palmetto State Armory, see infra notes 124–44 and accompanying text.
19. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (outlining few Second Amend-
ment cases prior to 1970s).
20. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2012); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as
Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 207 (2008) (explaining
how political climate of 1970s led to “the birth of a libertarian movement for Sec-
ond Amendment rights, which grew out of conservative ‘law and order’ challenges
to the Great Society” (internal citation omitted)); Azmat Khan, How Conservatives
“Reinvented” the Second Amendment, PBS: FRONTLINE, (Dec. 18, 2012, 3:42 PM),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/government-elections-politics/how-
4
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 3 [2017], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol62/iss3/1
2017] CASEBRIEF 487
Second Amendment debate by declaring constitutional protection of an
individual, rather than collective, right to bear arms in Heller.21  Because
the machine gun is a relatively modern development, the constitutional
quandary that its possession presents was not considered by courts until
relatively recently.22  Understanding the new issues presented by machine
gun possession requires a primer on previous Second Amendment juris-
prudence, the Gun Control Act of 1968, other relevant circuit court deci-
sions, and related Third Circuit precedent.23
A. An Army of One? An Overview of Early and Influential Supreme Court
Second Amendment Decisions
In 1875, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Cruikshank,24 one
of the first cases concerning the Second Amendment.25  The Court de-
clared that the Second Amendment does no more than prevent the fed-
eral government from infringing someone’s inherent right to bear arms
for a lawful purpose.26  In 1886, the Court again heard a Second Amend-
ment issue in Presser v. Illinois.27  In Presser, the Court held that an Illinois
law prohibiting citizens from forming their own militias was constitu-
tional.28  In doing so, however, the Court asserted that “states cannot . . .
conservatives-reinvented-the-second-amendment/ [https://perma.cc/X7GT-WWB
G] (arguing that “rise of the modern conservative movement in the ‘70s and ‘80s”
and National Rifle Association lobbying led to increasing popular opinion that
Second Amendment gives individuals right to bear arms unrelated to militia
service).
21. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (“There seems
to us no doubt, on the basis of both text and history, that the Second Amendment
conferred an individual right to keep and bear arms.”).
22. See supra note 9 and accompanying text that outlines circuit court deci-
sions regarding the inapplicability of Second Amendment protection to machine
gun possession.
23. For a further discussion of Second Amendment jurisprudence, the Gun
Control Act of 1968, and other circuit court cases, see infra notes 24–64 and ac-
companying text.
24. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
25. See id. at 544 (explaining that defendants in Cruikshank were charged with
infringing rights of newly freed African-Americans, including their right to bear
arms).
26. See id. at 553 (“[The right to bear arms] is not a right granted by the
Constitution.  Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for its
existence.  The second amendment[sic] declares that it shall not be infringed; but
this, as has been seen, means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Con-
gress.”).  The Court in Cruikshank implied that some amendments, including the
Second, protect individuals from having the federal government infringe upon
their rights, but do not protect against other citizens who may infringe their rights.
See id. (“This is one of the amendments that has no other effect than to restrict the
powers of the national government, leaving the people to look for their protection
against any violation by their fellow-citizens of the rights it recognizes . . . .”).
27. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
28. See id. at 264–65 (“We think it clear that the sections under consideration,
which only forbid bodies of men to associate together as military organizations, or
5
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[generally] prohibit the people from keeping and bearing arms” because
doing so would prevent the deployment of state militias.29
Notwithstanding these early cases, the Supreme Court did not issue
an influential decision on what types of firearms were protected under the
Second Amendment until 1939 in United States v. Miller.30 Miller involved
two men who were charged with transporting a sawed-off shotgun across
state lines, in violation of the National Firearms Act.31  The Miller court
ultimately held that the National Firearms Act does not violate the Second
Amendment.32  In reaching its decision, the Miller court determined that
the Second Amendment’s purpose was to “assure the continuation and
render possible the effectiveness of [militias]” and thus, the Second
Amendment “must be interpreted and applied with that end in view.”33  In
effect, the Supreme Court announced that the Constitution only pro-
tected a collective right to bear arms in connection with militia service,
rather than in an independent individual capacity.34
Miller stood as the definitive precedent on the Second Amendment
until 2008 when the Supreme Court heard Heller.35  In Heller, a plaintiff
sought to enjoin Washington, D.C. from enforcing its gun control statute,
to drill or parade with arms in cities and towns unless authorized by law, do not
infringe the right of the people to keep and bear arms.”).
29. See id. at 265 (arguing that banning individual firearm possession would
“deprive the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public
security, and disable the people from performing their duty to the general
government”).
30. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
31. See id. at 175 (explaining facts of Miller case); see also I.R.C. §§ 5841–49
(2012) (“The National Firearms Act”).
32. See Miller, 307 U.S. at 183 (stating that Supreme Court is reserving and
remanding district court decision).  The Court heard the case on direct appeal
from the district court and reversed the district court’s finding that the Act vio-
lated the Constitution. See id. at 177, 183 (reversing district court decision that
section 11 of Act violated Second Amendment and remanding case).
33. See id. at 178 (asserting Second Amendment’s purpose of allowing Con-
gress to maintain effective militia).  The Court also explained that a sawed-off shot-
gun is not reasonably related to maintenance of a well regulated militia nor part of
ordinary military equipment. See id. (arguing that sawed-off shotguns are not re-
lated to militia service).
34. See supra notes 30–33 and accompanying text that details the effect of the
Miller court’s holding; see also O’Shea, supra note 3 (“Despite its deficiencies, how-
ever, Miller did reach two significant conclusions about the Second Amendment.
First, it declared that the right to [bear] arms recognized in the Second Amend-
ment’s operative clause should be ‘interpreted and applied’ in a way that acknowl-
edges the civic purposes suggested by the prefatory clause’s reference to the
militia. . . .  Second, in conformity with this conception of the Second Amend-
ment, Miller held that an individual’s possession of a particular kind of firearm is
not constitutionally protected, unless that possession has ‘some reasonable rela-
tionship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.’”).
35. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008) (finding Sec-
ond Amendment individual right to bear arms unrelated to militia service, in con-
travention to Miller).
6
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which effectively banned handgun possession.36  The Supreme Court ulti-
mately accepted the plaintiff’s argument that the statute violated the Sec-
ond Amendment and held that D.C.’s gun control law was
unconstitutional.37  In reaching its decision, the Heller Court found that
the Second Amendment bestowed a right to bear arms on individuals, in-
dependent of militia service.38  The Court determined that the Second
Amendment protects possession of any firearms which “have some reason-
able relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated mili-
tia.”39  Thus, the Court distinguished Heller from Miller by declaring that
the sawed-off shotgun at issue in Miller was not a type of weapon reasona-
bly related to militia service.40  Through its decision in Heller, the Supreme
Court adopted a new view of the Second Amendment that protected an
individual’s possession of weapons reasonably related to militia service.41
B. Taking Aim at Gun Violence: The Gun Control Act of 1968
Prior to Heller, Congress passed the Gun Control Act of 1968.42  The
Gun Control Act contains many gun control measures aimed at curbing
gun violence.43  Section 922(o) of the Gun Control Act, as amended by
the Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986, is paramount to this discus-
sion and states that “it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or pos-
sess a machinegun.”44  Rather than providing its own definition of
36. See id. at 574–76 (explaining facts and procedure of Heller).  The D.C. gun
control statue at issue “generally prohibit[ed] the possession of handguns.” Id. at
574–75 (detailing how statute effectively banned handgun possession in D.C.).
37. See id. at 635 (“In sum, we hold that the District’s ban on handgun posses-
sion in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its prohibition against
rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for the purpose of immediate
self-defense.”). But see Robert Leider, Our Non-Originalist Right to Bear Arms, 89 IND.
L.J. 1587, 1646 (2014) (refuting Supreme Court’s claim that historically, militia
members used types of weapons citizens used at home for self-defense).
38. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of
both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right
to keep and bear arms.”).
39. See id. at 622 (explaining that Second Amendment “confers an individual
right to keep and bear arms,” but only arms reasonably related to “preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia”).
40. See id. at 621–22 (distinguishing Miller by explaining that type of weapon
at issue in Miller was not eligible for Second Amendment protection).
41. See supra notes 35–41 and accompanying text  for explanation of the Su-
preme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment expressed in Heller.
42. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 921–31 (2012) (Gun Control Act of 1968).
43. See id. at § 922 (listing statutory measures to curb gun violence); see also
Gun Control Act, BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS & EXPLOSIVES, https://
www.atf.gov/rules-and-regulations/gun-control-act [https://perma.cc/3YDH-
YPES] (last visited Feb. 15, 2017) (describing how Gun Control Act was enacted
particularly in response to “assassinations of President John F. Kennedy, Attorney
General Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.” and imposed stricter
licensing and regulation of firearms).
44. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2012); see also National Firearms Act, supra note 8
(explaining how Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986 amended Gun Control
7
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“machinegun,” the Gun Control Act uses the Internal Revenue Service’s
(IRS) definition from the previously enacted National Firearms Act.45
The National Firearms Act defined machine guns as “any weapon which
shoots . . . automatically more than one shot.”46  Based on this definition,
machine guns are presumably related to the preservation and efficiency of
militias because militarized forces use weapons capable of automatically
firing ammunition; therefore, the Gun Control Act appears to be in direct
conflict with the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment described in Heller.47
C. Scoping In and Out: An Examination of Other Circuit Court Decisions
Regarding Machine Gun Possession
Several circuit courts have considered whether machine gun posses-
sion is protected by the Second Amendment.48  Even though the Supreme
Court has not directly addressed this issue, every circuit to hear this issue
has held that the Gun Control Act’s machine gun ban does not violate the
Second Amendment.49  A brief analysis of post-Heller decisions from other
circuits is beneficial to this Casebrief’s discussion of the Third Circuit’s
opinion in One Palmetto State Armory.50
Act of 1968 to prohibit transfer/possession of machine guns); supra note 8 and
accompanying text that describes the Gun Control Act’s ban on machine guns
through Firearm Owners Protection Act of 1986.  See generally History of Gun-
Control Legislation, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national/history-of-gun-control-legislation/2012/12/22/80c8d624-4ad3-11e2-9a4
2-d1ce6d0ed278_story.html?utm_term=.eec167f57884 [https://perma.cc/NCV6-X
LWF] (discussing history of gun control legislation).
45. See supra note 8 (explaining how Gun Control Act uses National Firearms
Act’s definition of “machine gun” in its machine gun ban).
46. See supra note 8 (explaining National Firearms Act’s definition of “ma-
chine guns”).
47. See United States v. One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d 136, 138 (3d Cir.
2016) (explaining plaintiff’s contention that section 922(o) of Gun Control Act
violates his Second Amendment right to bear arms). See generally Peter Suciu, The
Long Guns: History of US Military Rifles, FOX NEWS  (Dec. 22, 2016), http://www.fox
news.com/tech/2016/12/22/long-guns-history-us-military-rifles.html [https://
perma.cc/ZFR4-SHKU] (explaining machine gun’s use in military); How The Ma-
chine Gun Changed Combat During World War I, NORWICH UNIV. ONLINE, http://grad
uate.norwich.edu/resources-mmh/infographics-mmh/how-the-machine-gun-
changed-combat-during-world-war-1/ [https://perma.cc/E7CT-LLLF] (last visited
Feb. 15, 2017) (explaining importance of machine gun to military, particularly
since World War I).
48. See supra note 9 (describing other circuit cases with Second Amendment
challenge to machine gun prohibition).
49. See supra note 9 (explaining that every circuit to hear issue of constitution-
ality of machine gun ban has held that Second Amendment does not protect right
to possess machine guns).
50. For a further discussion of other circuit court cases on Second Amend-
ment challenges to the machine gun ban, see infra notes 51–58 and accompanying
text.
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The Eighth Circuit first considered this issue in 2008 when a defen-
dant argued that section 922(o) of the Gun Control Act was unconstitu-
tional in United States v. Fincher.51  The Fincher court applied Miller and
Heller and held that “[m]achine guns are not in common use by law-abid-
ing citizens for lawful purposes and therefore fall within the category of
dangerous and unusual weapons that the government can prohibit for in-
dividual use.”52  In 2009, the Sixth Circuit quashed a similar challenge to
the Gun Control Act in Hamblen v. United States.53  The Hamblen court dis-
cussed Miller and Heller and held that the right to bear arms does not in-
clude the possession of machine guns.54
In 2012, the Ninth Circuit heard the same Second Amendment chal-
lenge in United States v. Henry.55  The Henry court stated that the Second
Amendment only protects possession of certain firearms.56  Citing Heller,
the Ninth Circuit declared that machine guns were “dangerous and unu-
sual” and not commonly used for lawful purposes.57 Fincher, Hamblen, and
Henry were the only major circuit decisions on Second Amendment chal-
lenges to the federal machine gun ban prior to One Palmetto State Armory.58
51. 538 F.3d 868, 870 (8th Cir. 2008) (stating that defendant is appealing
conviction based on argument that he has right to possess machine guns under
Second Amendment), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1174 (2009).
52. See id. at 874 (holding that defendant’s possession of machine gun is not
protected under Second Amendment because they are dangerous and unusual).
53. 591 F.3d 471, 474 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that, while Second Amend-
ment right is not clearly defined, it does not include possession of machine guns
for personal use).
54. See id. (explaining that Supreme Court foreclosed Second Amendment
challenge to machine gun act).  The Hamblen court cited the Supreme Court in
Heller which asserted “that it would be a ‘startling’ interpretation of precedent to
suggest that restrictions on machine guns, set forth in the National Firearms Act,
might be unconstitutional.” See id. (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S.
570, 623 (2008)).
55. 688 F.3d 637, 639 (9th Cir. 2012) (describing how defendant argued that
§ 922(o) of Gun Control Act violated Second Amendment right to bear arms).
56. See id. at 640 (explaining that Second Amendment “does not protect those
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes, such as
short-barreled shotguns” (citing Heller, 554 U.S. at 640)).
57. See id. (“In short, machine guns are highly ‘dangerous and unusual weap-
ons’ that are not ‘typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.’”
(quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 625, 627)).  The Henry court further explained that
A machine gun is “unusual” because private possession of all new ma-
chine guns, as well as all existing machine guns that were not lawfully
possessed before the enactment of § 922(o), has been unlawful since
1986.  Outside of a few government-related uses, machine guns largely
exist on the black market.
Id. (asserting that machine guns are not commonly used for lawful purposes).
58. See United States v. One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d 136, 143 (3d Cir.
2016) (explaining that other circuits that have heard Second Amendment chal-
lenges to federal machine gun prohibition have all held that machine gun posses-
sion is not protected under Second Amendment right to bear arms).  The court in
One Palmetto State Armory cited Fincher (Eighth Circuit), Henry (Ninth Circuit), and
Hamblen (Sixth Circuit) in reaching its holding. See id.  (“Our sister circuits have
consistently come to similar conclusions.”).  Just months after One Palmetto State
9
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D. Reloading: Post Heller, The Third Circuit Hears Second Amendment
Challenge to Gun Control Act
The Third Circuit used the Heller Court’s analytical framework to de-
cide a Second Amendment challenge in Marzzarella—a precursor to One
Palmetto State Armory.59  In Marzzarella, a defendant was convicted under
the Gun Control Act “for possession of a handgun with an obliterated se-
rial number.”60  The Third Circuit applied a two-pronged approach, ascer-
tained from Heller, to the Second Amendment challenge.61  First, although
the Third Circuit did not reach a conclusion on whether possession of
handguns with “obliterated serial number[s]” was protected under the
Second Amendment, the court found it dispositive that the Gun Control
Act passed constitutional muster under intermediate and strict scrutiny.62
In part one of the Heller framework, the Marzzarella court analyzed
whether handguns without serial numbers were “dangerous or unusual
weapons,” the likes of which are not protected by the Second Amend-
ment.63  Thus, Marzzarella is important to this Casebrief’s discussion be-
Armory, the Fifth Circuit followed circuit precedent in Hollis v. Lynch.  827 F.3d 436,
451 (5th Cir. 2016) (holding that “machineguns are not protected arms under the
Second Amendment”).  The Fifth Circuit explained that machine guns do not re-
ceive Second Amendment protection because they are “dangerous and unusual
and therefore not in common use.” See id. (“Machineguns are dangerous and unu-
sual and therefore not in common use.  They do not receive Second Amendment
protection, so we uphold Section 922(o) at step one of our framework.”).
59. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing
Heller to explain court’s reasoning).
60. See id. at 87–88 (explaining how defendant was indicted for possession of
firearm with obliterated serial number and subsequently plead guilty).
61. See id. at 89 (“As we read Heller, it suggests a two-pronged approach to
Second Amendment challenges.  First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes
a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s guaran-
tee.  If it does not, our inquiry is complete.  If it does, we evaluate the law under
some form of means-end scrutiny.  If the law passes muster under that standard, it
is constitutional.  If it fails, it is invalid.” (internal citations omitted)).
62. See id. at 101 (“Second Amendment doctrine remains in its nascency, and
lower courts must proceed deliberately when addressing regulations unmentioned
by Heller.  Accordingly, we hesitate to say Marzzarella’s possession of an unmarked
firearm in his home is unprotected conduct.  But because § 922(k) would pass
muster under either intermediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny, Marzzarella’s convic-
tion must stand.”).
63. See id. at 92 (explaining that Second Amendment does not protect posses-
sion of dangerous and unusual weapons (citing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570, 625–27 (2008))).  The Marzzarella court also proclaimed that “[i]t is ar-
guably possible to extend the exception for dangerous and unusual weapons to
cover unmarked firearms.” See id. at 95.  Further, the Marzzarella court rejected the
argument that the Gun Control Act was unconstitutional merely because it regu-
lated possession of certain firearms in an individual’s home—the type of firearm
possession the Supreme Court claimed was the originalist purpose of the Second
Amendment in Heller. See id. at 94 (arguing that possession of firearm at home for
self-defense is not protected in all circumstances). See generally Heller, 554 U.S. at
599, 603 (implying that self-defense is one of framer’s purposes for including right
to bear arms in Constitution).
10
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cause it represents the Third Circuit’s first major consideration of a
Second Amendment challenge to the Gun Control Act and it laid the
framework through which the court would now analyze the prohibition of
“dangerous and unusual weapon[s],” as it did in One Palmetto State
Armory.64
III. LOCKED AND LOADED: AN ANALYSIS OF
ONE PALMETTO STATE ARMORY
The Third Circuit directly considered the constitutionality of the Gun
Control Act’s machine gun prohibition in One Palmetto State Armory.65  The
court ultimately held that the Second Amendment does not protect the
possession of machine guns.66  In reaching its decision, the Third Circuit
considered the Supreme Court’s Second Amendment jurisprudence and
the specific applicability of the machine gun ban to gun trusts.67  This
section outlines the facts and procedural history of One Palmetto State Ar-
mory and provides a narrative analysis of the Third Circuit’s reasoning.68
A. A New Target: Facts and Procedural History of
One Palmetto State Armory
Ryan S. Watson (Watson) filed a suit against the United States govern-
ment for declaratory and injunctive relief after the Bureau of Alcohol, To-
bacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF) denied his family trust’s application
to make and possess a machine gun.69  A gun trust “is simply a trust cre-
ated to receive (or purchase) and manage certain federally restricted, but
legal-to-own, firearms.”70  The National Firearms Act requires a gun manu-
64. See supra notes 59–63 and accompanying text for discussion of Marzzarella.
65. See United States v. One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d 136, 138 (3d Cir.
2016) (asserting that claim is based on issue of whether Second Amendment is
violated by Gun Control Act’s machine gun ban).
66. See id. at 144 (holding that under Heller and Marzzarella, machine gun pos-
session is not protected by Second Amendment).
67. See id. at 141 (stating that Third Circuit’s analysis of Second Amendment
challenge to Gun Control Ban must begin with Heller).  Further, the Third Circuit
explained that the Gun Control Act applies to trusts because the individuals repre-
senting a trust are the persons who actually possess any firearms belonging to the
trust. See id. at 140 (declaring that Watson is natural person who acts on Trust’s
behalf and thus is subject to prohibitions of Gun Control Act).  Additionally, the
court held that Congress did not intend for the Gun Control Act to exempt trusts
from its purview. See id. at 140–41 (rejecting idea that Congress intended to effec-
tively “destroy” Gun Control Act through use of trust).
68. For a further discussion of the facts, procedural history, and narrative
analysis of One Palmetto State Armory, see infra notes 69–123 and accompanying text.
69. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 138–39 (describing how ATF ulti-
mately denied Watson’s application to manufacture and possess M-16 style ma-
chine gun).
70. See Lee-ford Tritt, Dispatches from the Trenches of America’s Great Gun Trust
Wars, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 743, 745 (2014) (“From a trust law perspective, a gun
trust is conceptually no different from other trusts.  The trustee of a gun trust
holds the trust property as a fiduciary for one or more beneficiaries, the trustee
11
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facturer to obtain permission from the ATF before manufacturing a fire-
arm.71  The ATF can deny permission if “making or possessing the
firearm” would be illegal—precisely what happened to the Watson’s appli-
cation.72  Watson brought the action “individually and on behalf of the
Watson Family Gun Trust” (the Trust) claiming that the Gun Control
Act’s machine gun ban violates the Second Amendment.73  This section
discusses the facts and procedural history of Watson’s case.74
1. Hired Gun: Facts of One Palmetto State Armory
In May and June 2014, Watson, as the sole trustee of the Trust, “sub-
mitted applications on behalf of the Trust to make and register an M-16-
style machine gun.”75  On August 5, 2014, an ATF agent accidently ap-
proved Watson’s application and Watson promptly “had a machine gun
manufactured.”76  Nevertheless, on September 10, 2014, the ATF in-
formed Watson that his approval was a mistake and his application was
denied because machine gun possession is prohibited by the Gun Control
Act.77  Watson argued that he was exempt from the machine gun ban be-
cause he was acting on behalf of the Trust and therefore, he did not fall
under the statutory definition of a “person” to which the Gun Control Act
takes legal title of the trust property, and beneficiaries enjoy the equitable title to
the trust property.”).
71. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 138 (explaining that National
Firearms Act requires permission from ATF to manufacture firearms); see also I.R.C.
§ 5822 (2012) (“No person shall make a firearm unless he has (a) filed with the
Secretary a written application, in duplicate, to make and register the firearm on
the form prescribed by the Secretary; (b) paid any tax payable on the making and
such payment is evidenced by the proper stamp affixed to the original application
form; (c) identified the firearm to be made in the application form in such man-
ner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe; (d) identified himself in the
application form in such manner as the Secretary may by regulations prescribe,
except that, if such person is an individual, the identification must include his
fingerprints and his photograph; and (e) obtained the approval of the Secretary to
make and register the firearm and the application form shows such approval.”).
72. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 138 (describing how ATF denies
applications if manufacture or possession would be unlawful); see also I.R.C. § 5822
(“Applications shall be denied if the making or possession of the firearm would
place the person making the firearm in violation of law.”).
73. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 138 (describing how Watson filed
suit on behalf of Trust and himself for violation of Second Amendment right to
bear arms).
74. For a further discussion of the facts and procedural history of One Palmetto
State Armory, see infra notes 75–97 and accompanying text.
75. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 138 (describing how Watson sent
application to ATF “for permission to make and register an M-16-style machine
gun”).
76. See id. at 138–39 (stating that “ATF examiner mistakenly approved one of
Watson’s applications [and] Watson had a machine gun manufactured pursuant to
that approval”).
77. See id. at 139 (discussing how ATF informed Watson that his application
was mistakenly approved and was actually “denied because he was prohibited by
law from possessing a machine gun”).
12
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applies.78  The ATF rejected this rationale and notified Watson that he
had to surrender his machine gun to the ATF.79
Under protest, Watson turned his machine gun over to an ATF agent
on November 14, 2014.80  On the same day, Watson filed suit against the
United States Attorney General and ATF Director seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief from the Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act’s de
facto machine gun ban.81  Watson argued that an outright ban on ma-
chine gun possession violates the Constitution’s Commerce Clause,82 as
well as its Second,83 Ninth,84 and Tenth85 Amendments.86  Further, Wat-
son claimed a violation of his Fifth Amendment87 due process rights and
78. See id. (recounting how Watson claimed to be exempt from Gun Control
Act’s machine gun ban because he was acting on behalf of Trust).  Watson argued
that a trust is “not a ‘person’ covered by the Gun Control Act.” See id.
79. See id. at 139, 141–42 (summarizing that Watson is not exempt from ma-
chine gun prohibition by acting through Trust).  “ATF explained that although a
trust is not a ‘person’ under the Act, a trust cannot legally make or hold property.
Therefore, ATF considers the individual acting on behalf of the trust to be the
proposed maker and possessor of the machine gun.” Id. at 139.  On October 10,
2014, an ATF agent called Watson to ask whether a machine gun had been manu-
factured after his initial application was approved and to notify Watson that if a
gun was made, it must be surrendered to the ATF. See id.  (stating that ATF con-
tacted Watson to inquire about machine gun manufacture and surrender of al-
ready made machine gun).
80. See id. (recalling that Watson turned machine gun over to ATF “under
protest” on November 14, 2014).
81. See id. (detailing how Watson filed suit against federal government seeking
declarative and injunctive relief from Gun Control Act and National Firearms Act).
Watson claimed that the two Acts and their implementing regulations “act as a de
facto ban on an entire class of arms” in violation of the Constitution. See id.; see also
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2012) (codifying Gun Control Act’s machine gun ban); I.R.C.
§§ 5801–5822  (2012) (describing National Firearms Act); 27 C.F.R. § 479.105
(2012) (detailing regulations that implement machine gun ban).
82. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“[The Congress shall have power] [t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.”).
83. See supra note 2 and accompanying text for of description Second Amend-
ment to United States Constitution.
84. See U.S. CONST. amend. IX (“The enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.”).
85. See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.”).
86. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 139 (acknowledging Watson’s
argument that machine gun ban violates his constitutional right to bear arms).
87. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law . . . .”).
13
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Fourteenth Amendment88 equal protection rights.89  Lastly, Watson
brought “a claim for detrimental reliance based on the ATF’s initial ap-
proval of his application.”90
2. Gun Shy: Procedural History of One Palmetto State Armory
“On January 16, 2015, the government moved to dismiss Watson’s ac-
tion for lack of standing and failure to state a claim.”91  The district court
held that Watson had standing, “but that he failed to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted.”92  Notably, the court ruled “that Watson
failed to state a claim under the Second Amendment because the Second
Amendment does not protect the possession of machine guns.”93  Addi-
tionally, the district court held “that a trust is incapable of owning a ma-
chine gun under § 922(o).”94
Watson appealed both of these district court holdings to the Third
Circuit.95  The Third Circuit was initially unsure if it had jurisdiction over
the case because the government’s forfeiture claim was still pending.96
Nevertheless, on “August 13, 2015, the District Court issued a certification
of entry of final judgment,” which put the case within the Third Circuit’s
jurisdiction, and the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo.97
88. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.  No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.”).
89. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 139 (reciting how “Watson al-
leged violations of his” equal protection and due process rights under Fourteenth
and Fifth Amendments).
90. See id. (stating how Watson also claimed “detrimental reliance based on
the ATF’s initial approval of his application”).  In response, the government filed
“a forfeiture action for Watson’s machine gun,” which was consolidated into one
claim. See id.
91. Id. (commenting that government moved to dismiss Watson’s action).
92. See id.
93. See id. (noting district court’s holding that Watson failed to state Second
Amendment claim because machine gun possession is not protected under right
to bear arms).
94. See id. (stating that district court held that trusts are also subject to ma-
chine gun ban).
95. See id. (explaining that Watson only appealed motion to dismiss and hold-
ing that trust was subject to Gun Control Act’s machine gun ban).
96. See id. (recalling Third Circuit’s apprehension to hear case because dis-
trict court decision was not yet final order).
97. See id. at 139 (detailing how “the District Court issued a certification of
entry of final judgment,” which gave Third Circuit jurisdiction to review case de
novo); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2012) (“The courts of appeals (other than the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit) shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . except
where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.”).
14
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B. Pulling the Trigger: Narrative Analysis of One Palmetto State Armory
The Third Circuit’s analysis in One Palmetto State Armory focused on
the Second Amendment, the Gun Control Act, and the Supreme Court’s
Heller opinion.98  As an initial issue, the court first considered Watson’s
claim that the machine gun ban does not apply to trusts.99  The court
explained that, although a trust is not statutorily defined as a person
under the Act, a trust is not a distinct entity that can act on its own.100
Thus, a trust needs to act through an individual—a trustee—who does fall
under the Act’s definition of a person and is prohibited from possessing a
machine gun.101  Further, the court stated that this finding was necessary
to the enforcement of the Gun Control Act because accepting Watson’s
trust argument would allow any individual to circumvent the machine gun
ban through the use of a trust.102  The court “refuse[d] to conclude that
with one hand Congress intended to enact a statutory rule that would re-
strict the transfer or possession of certain firearms, but with the other
hand it created an exception that would destroy that very rule.”103
98. For a further discussion of the narrative analysis of One Palmetto State Ar-
mory, see infra notes 99–123 and accompanying text.
99. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 140 (noting that court will first
consider Watson’s argument that trusts are exempt from machine gun ban).  The
court considered this claim first because it was an issue of constitutional avoidance.
See id. (“When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even
if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this
Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by
which the question may be avoided.” (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62
(1932))).  Watson claimed that section 922(o) does not include “trust” in its defini-
tion of a “person” to which the law applies. See id.
100. See id. at 140–141 (asserting that Watson himself is subject to machine
gun ban even when acting as trustee of trust); see also 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1) (2012)
(defining person as “any individual, company, association, firm, partnership, soci-
ety, or joint stock company”).
101. See id. (stating that trust must act through trustee, who is subject to ma-
chine gun ban).  The court explained that a trust is not an entity “capable of legal
action on its own,” and only acts through a trustee. See id. at 140.  Even acting as a
trustee, Watson himself was prohibited from possessing a machine gun under the
Gun Control Act. See id.  (stating that ATF cannot grant Watson’s machine gun
application because he is prohibited from possessing it).  Watson is an individual
and thus considered a “person” under § 922(a)(1). See id. (defining “person”).
102. See id. at 140 (“Moreover, this holding is necessarily correct because to
interpret the Gun Control Act as Watson suggests would allow any party—includ-
ing convicted felons, who are expressly prohibited from possessing firearms under
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)—to avoid liability under this section simply by placing a
machine gun ‘in trust.’”).  The court notes that if it accepted Watson’s argument
and exempted trusts from the machine gun ban, then “[a]ny ‘individual, company,
association, firm, partnership, society, or joint stock company’” could lawfully pos-
sess a machine gun using this method.” See id.  (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(1)).
103. See id. at 140 (“Interpreting the statute so as to include this exception
would thereby swallow the rule.”); see also Andrew Blake, Machine Gun Ban Upheld
by Federal Appeals Court, WASH. TIMES (May 19, 2016), http://www.washingtontimes.
com/news/2016/may/19/machine-gun-ban-upheld-by-federal-appeals-court/
[https://perma.cc/4WD9-DE4Q] (explaining court’s rejection of Watson’s trust
argument).
15
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Next, the court considered Watson’s facial constitutional challenge to
the machine gun ban.104  The Third Circuit first cited Heller and discussed
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Second Amendment right to
bear arms.105  The Third Circuit reiterated the Supreme Court’s declara-
tion that Second Amendment protection “extends only to certain types of
weapons, [specifically] those weapons ‘in common use’ and not ‘those
weapons not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful pur-
poses.’”106  Further, the Third Circuit cited Marzzarella and described its
“two-pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges.”107
“First, we ask whether the challenged law imposes a burden on
conduct falling within the scope of the Second Amendment’s
guarantee.”  If it does not, the inquiry ends.  If it does, we move
on to the second step: “[W]e evaluate the law under some form
of means-end scrutiny.  If the law passes muster under that stan-
dard, it is constitutional.  If it fails, it is invalid.”108
Under the first prong of analysis, the Third Circuit found that the
machine gun ban does not burden conduct protected by the Second
Amendment.109  The court noted that Heller explicitly discussed machine
guns and implied that their possession may be banned without infringing
on the Second Amendment.110  In addition, the Third Circuit discussed its
104. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 141 (acknowledging Watson’s
facial Second Amendment challenge to machine gun ban).
105. See id. (analyzing Heller and explaining that Supreme Court held that
Second Amendment guarantees individual right to possess firearms).
106. See id. (describing how Heller recognized that individual right to bear
arms is not unlimited right to possess any firearm anywhere for any purpose (quot-
ing District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 623, 625, 627 (2008))).  The Third
Circuit further explains that in Heller, the Supreme Court overturned a handgun
ban because it constituted a categorical ban of a particular type of firearm—the
handgun—which is “ ‘overwhelmingly chosen by American society’ for the ‘lawful
purpose’ of self-defense in the home, ‘where the need for defense of self, family,
and property is most acute.’” Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 628).
107. See id. (outlining Third Circuit’s two-pronged approach to analyzing Sec-
ond Amendment challenges).  For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s two-
pronged approach to Second Amendment challenges first articulated in Marz-
zarella, see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
108. One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 141 (describing two-pronged ap-
proach Third Circuit adopted, in accordance with Supreme Court’s analysis in Hel-
ler (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010))).  For a
further discussion of the Third Circuit’s two-pronged approach to Second Amend-
ment challenges, in accordance with Heller, see supra note 61 and accompanying
text.
109. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 141 (“Heller and subsequent de-
cisions in our Court make clear that the de facto ban on machine guns found in
§ 922(o) does not impose a burden on conduct falling within the scope of the
Second Amendment.”).
110. See id. at 141–42 (noting that Heller mentions machine guns numerous
times and suggests that they may constitutionally be banned).
It may be objected that if weapons that are most useful in military ser-
vice—M–16 rifles and the like—may be banned, then the Second Amend-
16
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reasoning in Marzzarella, a similar Second Amendment challenge.111  The
Marzzarella court held that “restrictions on the possession of dangerous
and unusual weapons are not constitutionally suspect because these weap-
ons are outside the ambit of the amendment.”112  The Marzzarella opinion
also stated that the Supreme Court has made it clear that “dangerous and
unusual weapon[s]” do not fall under Second Amendment protection.113
In relying on Marzzarella, the court in One Palmetto State Armory held “that
the Second Amendment does not protect the possession of machine guns
[because t]hey are not in common use for lawful purposes.”114
The court in One Palmetto State Armory then proceeded to note that its
decision was in accordance with all other circuit courts faced with the con-
stitutionality of the machine gun ban.115  Nonetheless, Watson tried to
argue that “dangerous and unusual” referred to the manner in which a
weapon is used, not to a particular type of firearm.116  However, the court
rejected this argument, first by noting again that all other circuits were in
agreement that “dangerous and unusual” referred to types of weapons,
and “not the manner in which a weapon is used.”117  Next, the court ex-
plained that the Heller court consistently used “dangerous and unusual”
ment right is completely detached from the prefatory clause . . . .  But the
fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit between the
prefatory clause and the protected right cannot change our interpreta-
tion of the right.
Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627–28).
111. See id. at 142 (discussing Third Circuit’s opinion in Marzzarella).  For a
further discussion of Marzzarella, see supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
112. See id. (quoting United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 91–92 (3d Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1158 (2011)).
113. See id. (explaining that unlawful weapons in home are not afforded Sec-
ond Amendment protection).  “If this were the case, ‘[p]ossession of machine
guns or . . .  other dangerous and unusual weapon[s]—so long as they were kept in
the home, would then fall within the Second Amendment.  But the Supreme
Court has made clear that the Second Amendment does not protect those types of
weapons.’” Id. (citing Marzzarella, 614 U.S. at 94 (internal citations omitted)).
114. See id. (“In case Marzzarella left any doubt, we repeat today that the Sec-
ond Amendment does not protect the possession of machine guns.  They are not
in common use for lawful purposes.” (citations omitted)).
115. See id. at 143 (noting that all other circuit courts to consider issue agree
with Third Circuit’s decision).  For a further discussion of other circuit court cases
that heard Second Amendment challenges to the Gun Control Act’s machine gun
ban, see supra notes 48–58 and accompanying text.
116. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 143  (citing Watson’s brief, in
which appellant asserted that “dangerous and unusual” designation applies to
manner in which firearm is possessed, not categories of firearms).
117. See id. (citing other circuit decisions which apply “dangerous and unu-
sual” designation to possession of certain types of firearms, namely machine guns).
Further, Watson even conceded that “a majority of courts” adopt this analysis. See
id. (stating that Watson concedes no courts have yet to adopt his proposed
analysis).
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when referring to types of weapons.118  Therefore, the Third Circuit re-
jected Watson’s argument.119
Watson also argued that Heller invalidated categorical bans on certain
weapons.120  In response, the Third Circuit explained that “Heller [gave]
special consideration to the District of Columbia’s categorical ban on
handguns because they ‘are the most popular weapon chosen by Ameri-
cans for self-defense in the home.’”121  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
expressly limited Heller’s holding to handguns, and never stated or implied
that categorical bans of certain weapons are unconstitutional.122  As such,
the Third Circuit rejected Watson’s contention that categorical firearms
bans are invalid under the Second Amendment.123
IV. BRINGING OUT THE BIG GUNS: CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND IMPACT OF
ONE PALMETTO STATE ARMORY AND INSIGHT FOR FUTURE
LITIGANTS IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT
The Third Circuit’s decision in One Palmetto State Armory is directly in
line with other circuit court decisions on Second Amendment challenges
to the machine gun ban, as well as with Heller.124  The Third Circuit con-
cluded that machine guns are “dangerous and unusual,” and further
found that machine guns are “not in common use for lawful purposes.”125
Therefore, based on Heller, machine guns can be regulated, even to the
118. See id. (“And looking at the ‘dangerous and unusual’ phrase in context,
the most logical reading is that ‘dangerous and unusual’ describes certain catego-
ries of weapons, and not the manner in which the weapons are used.”).  Further,
the Third Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court discussed “‘dangerous and
unusual’ weapons immediately after discussing what ‘sorts of weapons’ [prece-
dent] protects, and just before the Court discusses why certain types of weapons,
even those ‘that are most useful in military service—M–16 rifles and the like—’
may be banned.” Id.
119. See id. (declining to adopt Watson’s interpretation of “dangerous and
unusual” as used in Heller).
120. See id. at 143–44 (acknowledging Watson’s claim that Heller prohibits any
categorical bans of particular types of firearms).
121. See id. at 144 (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 629
(2008)).
122. See id. (explaining that Heller holding is limited to ban of handguns used
for self-defense in home).  The Third Circuit reasoned that Heller does not stand
for the proposition “that a categorical ban on any particular type of bearable arm
is unconstitutional,” and even “contains clear statements to the contrary.” See id.
(explaining that Heller does not deem categorical bans unconstitutional).
123. See id. (holding that machine guns are not protected by the Second
Amendment).
124. See supra notes 35–41, 48–58 and accompanying text for analysis of Heller
and numerous circuit court decisions on Second Amendment challenges to the
machine gun ban.
125. See One Palmetto State Armory, 822 F.3d at 141–44 (holding that machine
guns are dangerous, unusual, and not in common usage for lawful purposes (inter-
nal citation omitted)).
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point of prohibition, without infringing upon the Second Amendment.126
One Palmetto State Armory signals to Third Circuit litigants and attorneys
that the court is unwilling, and likely unable, to accept a facial challenge
to the Gun Control Act’s machine gun ban.127
Nevertheless, attorneys hoping to challenge the machine gun ban can
argue that in Heller, the Supreme Court never expressly declared the ma-
chine gun ban constitutional.128  Further, commentators have questioned
whether a machine gun ban comports with Heller’s purported originalist
interpretation of the Second Amendment.129  The Supreme Court held
that the purpose of the Second Amendment was to confer upon citizens
an individual right to bear arms.130  This right was to ensure citizens could
possess arms to serve in a militia, defend themselves, hunt, and in theory,
protect the citizenry from a tyrannical government.131  Therefore, it is dif-
ficult to see how a machine gun ban—proscribing the type of weapons
that would be needed in a modern militia, or to defend against a tyrant—
is not inconsistent with the originalist purpose of the Second Amend-
126. See id. at 144 (“Since the Supreme Court’s opinion in Heller, courts na-
tionwide have debated the parameters of that decision, and the extent to which
government regulation may be reconciled with the Second Amendment.  How-
ever, on at least one issue the courts are in agreement: governments may restrict
the possession of machine guns.”).  For a further analysis of Heller and its discus-
sion of machine guns, see supra notes 9–10, 35–41 and accompanying text.
127. See id. (declaring that facial constitutional challenges to machine gun
ban fail under existing case law and the “plain language provided by the Supreme
Court”).  In One Palmetto State Armory, the Third Circuit “declined to depart from
this standard.” See id. (stating that Third Circuit would not break from precedent
on machine gun ban validity).
128. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–28 (2008) (discuss-
ing constitutionally valid limitations on Second Amendment).  The Heller Court
never recognized the constitutionality of a machine gun ban, but did discuss and
affirm the historical and “longstanding prohibitions” on certain types of firearms
possession. See id. at 626 (“From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, com-
mentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and
carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever pur-
pose.”).  Additionally, the Heller court only alluded to machine guns in its discus-
sion of the common usage test for weapons protected by the Second Amendment.
See id. at 626–27 (recognizing historical tradition of prohibiting possession of dan-
gerous and unusual firearms).
129. See, e.g., Hatt, supra note 4 at 517 (“The Second Amendment’s original
purpose, as read by the Heller Court, was to enable Americans, if needed, to resist
the tyranny of the federal government by armed force.”).  Hatt further remarks
that “[t]hough the Court’s reasoning recognizes this historical purpose of the Sec-
ond Amendment, its holding does not, for Heller’s Second Amendment is a right
primarily about self-defense, not resisting tyranny.” See id. at 518; see also Leider,
supra note 37 at 1646 (refuting Supreme Court’s claim that historically, militia
members used types of weapons citizens used at home for self-defense).
130. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of
both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right
to keep and bear arms.”).
131. See supra notes 3–4 for a further discussion of the proposed purposes for
the Second Amendment.
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ment.132  As such, a Third Circuit practitioner hoping to bring a Second
Amendment challenge to the machine gun ban can make an argument
that the ban directly contradicts the purpose of the right to bear arms by
only protecting firearms in common use at the time.133
Relatedly, a Third Circuit practitioner can argue that machine guns
are no longer “dangerous and unusual weapons” because of their long-
established use as a military weapon.134  Pursuant to the purpose of the
Second Amendment, machine guns are necessary to militia service in
modern times and would also be the type of weapon needed to defend
against government tyranny.135  Machine guns certainly “ha[ve] some rea-
sonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated
militia.”136
However, even if the Third Circuit accepted that machine guns are no
longer considered “dangerous and unusual” and are related to militia ser-
vice, a practitioner must still overcome the hurdle that machine guns are
not “in common use.”137  A possible rebuttal is that the only reason ma-
chine guns are not commonly used is because they are statutorily barred
132. See Siegel, supra note 20 at 193 (“Heller holds that government cannot
deprive citizens of traditional weapons of self-defense, but may ban civilian use of
military weapons, even if this means that the right to bear arms may no longer be
effectively exercised for the republican purpose of resisting tyranny that the ‘prefa-
tory clause’ discusses.  It is, to say the least, striking that an originalist interpreta-
tion of the Second Amendment would treat civic republican understandings of the
amendment as antiquated, and refuse to protect the arms a militia needs to defend
against tyranny.”); see also Lieder, supra note 37 at 1649 (“By using the common-law
rule to justify prohibitions against ‘M-16 rifles and the like,’ Justice Scalia com-
pletely inverted the Second Amendment from its nineteenth-century understand-
ing: army rifles to resist tyranny are out; handguns in the home for private
purposes are in.  How could an originalist interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment exclude from its protection the kinds of weapons necessary to resist tyranny?
An originalist interpretation cannot.  Justice Scalia is not engaged in originalism;
he is engaged in Ackermanian-style intergenerational synthesis.” (footnotes
omitted)).
133. See supra notes 128–32 and accompanying text for argument that the
machine gun ban contradicts the originalist purpose of the Second Amendment.
134. See Suciu, supra note 47 (explaining how machine guns have long been
used in military); How The Machine Gun Changed Combat During World War I, supra
note 47 (explaining how machine guns gained military popularity during World
War I).
135. See supra notes 129–32 and accompanying text for a description of how
proclaimed purpose of Second Amendment does not comport with the machine
gun ban because machine guns are commonly used in a military context.
136. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 622 (2008) (declaring
that Second Amendment protects individual right to keep and bear only arms that
are reasonably related to “preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia”).
For a further discussion of the requirement that firearms bear a relationship to
militia service, see supra note 39 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 51–58, 106 and accompanying text for a discussion of how
only firearms in lawful, common usage are protected under the Second
Amendment.
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from common use.138  Thus, the only reason machine guns are not com-
monly used for lawful purposes is because the government has banned
machine guns for lawful purposes.139  This directly contravenes the Sec-
ond Amendment’s purpose of combatting government tyranny because a
federal statute expressly prevents machine guns from being commonly
used; the federal government could forever stymie the citizenry’s ability to
resist tyranny by prohibiting possession of the most modern firearms.140
Attorneys arguing to uphold the machine gun ban can rely on prece-
dent that holds that the machine gun ban does not violate the Second
Amendment, specifically Heller and One Palmetto State Armory.141  Because
the Third Circuit is bound by this precedent, any facial Second Amend-
ment challenge to the machine gun ban will likely fail.142  Practitioners
can further argue that nothing has changed since these cases were de-
cided such that machine guns should now be considered commonly used
for lawful purposes.143  Thus, absent congressional action, it appears that
the machine gun ban will continue to be upheld in the Third Circuit, in
light of One Palmetto State Armory.144
138. See Hatt, supra note 4 at 519 (“The Heller Court supported its presump-
tive restriction on the types of firearms that the Second Amendment protects with
a circular argument.  As explained above, the Court held that the Second Amend-
ment protects only a certain range of firearms, namely those in ‘common use at
the [present] time’—a standard that military weapons like machine guns do not
meet.  The problem with this conclusion is that firearms like machine guns are not
in ‘common use’ because their possession is currently banned by federal law.”
(footnotes omitted)).
139. See id. (“In other words, the Court reaches the strange result of exclud-
ing machine guns, among other types of firearms, from the Second Amendment’s
protection because Congress, the very body whose power the Amendment seeks to
restrain, has outlawed them.”).
140. See supra notes 129–39 and accompanying text for an explanation of how
bans on machine guns do not comport with original purpose of Second Amend-
ment and machine guns are not in common usage only because they are federally
prohibited from common use.
141. For a further discussion of Heller and One Palmetto State Armory, see supra
notes 35–41, 65–123 and accompanying text.
142. For a further discussion of the Third Circuit’s analysis in One Palmetto
State Armory, see supra notes 98–123 and accompanying text.
143. For a further discussion of circuit court cases that discuss the fact that
machine guns are not commonly used for lawful purposes, see supra notes 51–58,
106 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 125–27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Third Circuit’s desire to not break precedent on Second Amendment challenges
to Gun Control Act’s machine gun ban.  For a further discussion of Third Circuit’s
analysis in One Palmetto State Armory, see supra notes 98–123 and accompanying
text.
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